Earnings Differentials between German and French Speakers in Switzerland by Cattaneo, Alejandra & Winkelmann, Rainer
  
 
 
Socioeconomic Institute 
Sozialökonomisches Institut 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 0309 
 
Earnings Differentials between German and French 
Speakers in Switzerland 
 
Alejandra Cattaneo and Rainer Winkelmann 
 
November 2003  
 
 
Socioeconomic Institute 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper No. 0309 
Earnings Differentials between German and French Speakers in Switzerland 
 
 
November  2003 
 
Author’s addresses Alejandra Cattaneo 
 E-mail: alejandra.cattaneo@sts.unizh.ch 
 
 Rainer Winkelmann  
 E-mail: winkelmann@sts.unizh.ch 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
Publisher Sozialökonomisches Institut 
Bibliothek (Working Paper) 
Rämistrasse 71 
CH-8006 Zürich 
Phone: +41-1-634 21 37 
Fax: +41-1-634 49 82 
URL: www.soi.unizh.ch 
E-mail: soilib@soi.unizh.ch 
 
 
Earnings Differentials between German
and French speakers in Switzerland
Alejandra Cattaneo
University of Zurich
Rainer Winkelmann∗
University of Zurich, CEPR, London and IZA, Bonn
November 2003
Abstract
The paper analyses the effect of mother tongue on labor market outcomes of Swiss
residents. This type of analysis can shed light on an important policy question. Is
the Swiss labor market well integrated, or can one find instead segmentation along
language borders? Improving on previous research in this area, we use a nationally
representative household survey, the Swiss Household Panel 1999 and 2000, and we
explicitly account for self-selection of workers into language areas. Overall, we find
no evidence to suggest that the Swiss labor market is not perfectly integrated or that
internal migrants are positively selected
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1 Introduction
Economists have not taken great interest in the study of language so far, with the no-
table exception of the economic analysis of immigration, where investments in language
skills are recognized as decisive for the integration process (Chiswick, 1991, Dustmann
and Fabbri, 2003). However, this dismissive attitude may be about to change. One
challenge is the surge of research at the intersection of psychology and economics that
aims to establish a richer model of human behavior and motivation, opening up the
black box of ”given preferences”. Cognitive processes – language being an integral part
of it – move to center stage. Indeed, a school of thought in linguistics has argued for
a long time that language determines thought and action (Whorf, 1956).
A second development is the increased recognition that social interactions are im-
portant for understanding human behavior and economic outcomes. Again, language is
an integral aspect. A third question is linked to globalization: in a globalized world, is
the optimal number of languages in the world greater than, or equal to, one? These ex-
amples are indicative of, though by no means exhausting, the type of language related
questions economists might become interested in.
The topic of the current paper directly relates to the second and third points, the
role of language as an integrating or disintegrating force of economic activity. What
is the role of language, in relation to other factors such as jurisdiction and geography,
to shape markets? What borders matter more, those of countries or those of shared
language? Often these two coincide but almost as often they do not, as the examples
of many English speaking countries on one hand, and multilingual countries such a
Switzerland and Belgium on the other, illustrate.
We approach the issue of shared language in the context of labor markets, using
the Swiss experience as a case study. Switzerland has four official languages: German,
French, Italian and Romansh, although the latter is only spoken by a small minority.
The three main languages correspond to three largely homogeneous linguistic regions.
In such a multilingual country one might expect that language diversity generates
segmented labor markets.
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In this paper, we will test whether labor markets are integrated along language
frontiers. Labor market integration can be defined in a number of ways. In a first
definition “the law of one wage” holds across linguistic regions: Workers of similar
skills receive the same wage, regardless of linguistic region. There are three classical
mechanisms that each result in the law of one wage: mobility of workers, movements
of capital, trade.
An alternative definition of integration is that the law of one wage holds within
any given linguistic region when comparing native and nonnative workers, i.e., workers
whose mother tongue matches the dominant language and those for whom this is not
the case, usually because they moved across the language border. On one hand, this
is a weaker form of integration: there can be wage equality within a linguistic region
but wage dispersion across linguistic regions. On the other hand, it is stronger, since it
focusses on labor mobility (and the resulting wages) as a precondition for integration,
whereas the first type of integration does not necessarily require labor mobility.
We concentrate in our paper on this second form of integration because it relates
specifically to the effect of language. In contrast, when comparing wages across lin-
guistic regions, wage differentials are affected by non-linguistic factors as well, such as
geography, institutions, industrial structure and the like. Thus, we compare in this
paper wages of natives and nonnatives in a given linguistic region, and evaluate the
extent to which language matters for earnings. We will answer this question using
different methods, carefully addressing the issue of self-selection bias that can result if
the nonnatives observed in the sample (i.e. those who decided to move into a region
where their mother tongue does not match the dominant language) are not a random
selection of all nonnatives.
The implications of such a study extend beyond the Swiss case as its methods and
results can be applied to other multilingual countries such as Belgium or Canada, as
well as common markets such as the European Union, where despite the cultural and
linguistic differences among their members, there are no legal barriers for residents of
member countries to move from one country to another.
The paper uses data from the Swiss Household Panel, which are well suited for this
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purpose as they contains information on the respondents’ language skills, place of resi-
dence and income. There are momentarily no other representative survey data available
in Switzerland, which include all the necessary information for such an analysis. The
decennial census, for example, has the advantage of providing information on language
spoken and region of residence for the entire population but it does not contain any
information on income or earnings. Another survey done periodically in Switzerland
is the Swiss Labor Force Survey. It includes detailed information on income but no
information on language skills except for language spoken at the interview.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the previous literature
on the economics of language paying special attention to the studies that analyze the
difference in earnings among language groups in multilingual countries. In Section 3,
we discuss the research topic we consider in this paper, which is the integration of
the Swiss labor market. In Section 4, we present the data and describe briefly the
modalities of the data collection. Section 5 introduces the methods we use to analyze
the data, while the results obtained are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 gives
concluding remarks.
2 Previous Literature
Since the 1960s there have been many studies on the link between earnings and lan-
guage among immigrants. More recent contributions to this literature include Chiswick
(1991), Chiswick and Miller (1994, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2002), Dustmann and van Soest
(2001) and Dustmann and Fabbri (2003). Even though some useful insights can be
obtained from these studies, we will not discuss them in detail as our analysis will not
consider immigrants.
More relevant to our present study and closer to the Swiss case is the prior research
on language issues in Canada. This literature has been growing especially since the
mid 1960s when the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism made public
a study showing a big earnings gap in favor of Anglophones in Montreal. A number
of following studies, among them Carliner (1981), Grenier (1987), Vaillancourt (1978)
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and Veltman (1979), confirmed that earnings of Francophones were lower than earnings
of Anglophones and returns from learning English for Francophones were higher than
returns from learning French for Anglophones. Different explanations have been given
for this fact. Mostly, they refer to the concentration of power in the hands of English
speakers in the English Canada and the disproportionate share of economic power of
English speakers in Quebec. However the earnings disparities seemed to have declined
considerably since the 70s.
For Switzerland there are two previous studies by Grin (1997, 1998), where he
compares the socioeconomic status of Germanophones, Francophones and Italophones.
For a report completed for the Federal Office of Statistics (1997) he uses data collected
for a project called ’Linguistic competences in Switzerland’. The sample consists of
2400 respondents and contains information on mother tongue and competences in other
languages making the distinction between listening, writing, speaking and reading skills
and between four levels of knowledge for each category. In this report Grin analyses
the relationship between earnings and language, separately for men and women, using
adjusted residuals, multivariate regression and Oaxaca decomposition analysis. He
finds that for German and French speaking men there are no significant differences in
terms of earnings, whereas Italophones seem to have significantly lower earnings than
Germanophones. This result was confirmed in Grin (1998), where he analyses whether
speaking Italian as mother tongue involves a penalty. For women, mother tongue
doesn’t seem to have any influence on earnings, as there is no significant difference
between earnings of Germanophone, Francophone and Italophone females. In contrast
to Grin, we use more recent data from a nationally representative sample and we control
for self-selection.
3 Does Language Matter?
In a multilingual country such as Switzerland, the various language regions could ef-
fectively produce a labor market that is segmented along language borders rather than
fully integrated. There are a number of conceivable indicators of labor market inte-
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gration. A first indicator would be the degree of wage equality and convergence across
linguistic regions. The problem with this indicator is that wage differentials between
regions are affected by non-linguistic factors as well, such as geography, institutions,
industrial structure and the like.
A second indicator would be the extent of mobility that takes place between lan-
guage regions. Mobility is not the main concern of this paper. Rather, we propose
an alternative indicator of labor market integration, namely the absence of wage dis-
crimination. In any language region, otherwise equally qualified workers should earn
the same wage, regardless of their region of origin. In other words, the mother tongue
should not matter. This is, of course, only a meaningful concept if we can assume that
people living in Switzerland are truly bi or tri-lingual. There is some evidence that
this is the case. Every Swiss child has to learn at least one further national language
at school. In the German part of Switzerland, children learn French. In the French
part, they learn German.
Under the perfect integration hypothesis, we should observe that people who work
and live in a nonnative region should have the same earnings as those born and raised
in that region, controlling for skills such as years of schooling and experience. Thus, we
will compare the earnings of workers born and raised in one region with the earnings
of workers who moved to that region from within another Swiss region. Note that
this avoids wage comparisons across regions, comparisons that are made complicated
by differences in industrial structure and in cost of living. There are a number of
explanations, why markets might be segmented, i.e., why the language frontier may
mean more than a language effect.
- Cultural differences between regions. Language origin can be related to certain
cultural habits or prejudices that are rewarded differently in different regions
- Missing networks. The lack of social contacts in the host region can make it
difficult for a person to find a job matching to his/her skills
- Differences in the school systems. When the quality of schooling differs from
region to region, a person from a region with lower education quality receives a
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lower wage.
- The experience acquired in the region of origin could be less valued than experi-
ence obtained at the destination.
So, if we find evidence for segmentation, the next step would be to identify its
origins.
4 Data
The following empirical analysis is based on data from the Swiss Household Panel
(SHP). This is an annual survey of a nationally representative sample of more than
5000 households and all its members who are older than 14. The data collection is
funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, the University of Neuchaˆtel, and
the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics. The interviews are held in French, German, or
Italian, depending on the preference of the respondent. The data collection method is
Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). We use waves 1999 and 2000, which
include information on the respondents’ language skills, canton of residence and other
relevant socio-economic characteristics. The data from the SHP have been combined
with data from the 1990 census, which provide some complementary information about
regional and communal characteristics of the respondents’ place of residence. We would
have prefered to use the 2000 census for this purpose but these data were not yet
available for public use at the time of writing this paper.
In order to find out if there are differences in earnings of native and nonnative
speakers living in a certain part of Switzerland we need to delimit each linguistic
region. To do this, we first determine the majority language spoken in each commune.
In particular, we use information from the census on the percentage of people in each
commune who speak a certain language as mother tongue, identified in the data as “first
language for personal use”. These percentages were obtained by dividing the number of
people who have a particular mother tongue by the total population in the commune.
People who live in communes where more than 50% of the population speak French
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were categorized as belonging to the French region. People who live in communes
where more than 50% of the population speak German were considered as belonging
to the German region. Individuals can then be either classified as natives if their
mother tongue matches the majority language, or as nonnatives else. Individuals from
communes with no language predominance were excluded from the sample. Because
of the small amount of observations we have in the SHP for Italian speakers and the
Italian canton, these were exclude from the analysis as well.
It could be argued that, for the purpose of our study, a more adequate definition
of being native or nonnative should be based on the dominant language at the work-
ing place rather than at the place of residence. Unfortunately, this information is not
available. All people living in a nonnative region and commuting to a native region
would then be misclassified as nonnatives (and vice versa). We don’t think that this
is a major problem in practice. However, the following results have to be interpreted
under the (possibly invalid) assumption that the occurrence of cases for which dom-
inant language at the place of residence and work differ does not bias the analysis
systematically.
The sample is restricted to Swiss born residents aged 18 to 65, whose annual full-
time equivalent earnings are more than 10000 Francs. After deleting records with
missing data, we obtain a sample of 5199 pooled observations. In the following we will
report standard errors adjusted for pooling whenever appropiate.
——– Table 1 ——–
In Table 1, we present the means of some selected variables, together with their
estimated standard errors. We display results separately for natives, nonnatives and for
the whole sample. There are 5075 individuals who live in a region where their mother
tongue matches the dominant language and 124 whose mother tongue does not match
the dominant language in their region of residence. The small number of nonnatives
causes the standard errors of the variables’ means to be larger. The 46% of the sample
are women but the proportion of females is higher for nonnatives, 64% against 46%
for natives. The average levels of education and experience are about 14 and 21 years
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respectively.
Mean earnings of nonnatives are about 3 log points (or 3 percent) below those of
natives. Here and elsewhere, we interpret differences in mean log-earnings as rela-
tive differences in mean earnings (in levels). Strictly speaking, this interpretation is
admissible only under the additional assumption of homoskedasticity and for small
log-differentials (Winkelmann, 2001).
The point estimate suggests that working in a region where one’s mother tongue
is spoken is associate with higher earnings. However, a formal t-test for difference in
means cannot reject the null of no difference in earnings of natives and nonnatives (t =
0.74). So looking at overall averages, there appears to be no evidence for a segmented
labor market. However, this result may be spurious, as natives and nonnatives may
differ in other respects, and we should control for any other influences on earnings
through multiple regression. This will be done in Section 6 of the paper.
5 Empirical Methods
To test whether native and nonnative speakers have the same earnings, ceteris paribus,
we adjust the raw differential using standard regression techniques. In particular, our
analysis will be based on a human capital earnings function of the form:
w = α+ x ′β + δnonnative+ ε (1)
where w are logarithmic earnings, x is the vector of the individual’s personal char-
acteristics that affect earnings, and nonnative is a dummy variable that equals one if
the individual’s mother tongue matches the dominant language in his/her region of
residence and zero otherwise. The coefficient of nonnative, δ, measures the so-called
treatment effect. The ”treatment” in this case is whether or not the individual moved
from its region of origin and thereby becomes a nonnative. The null hypothesis to be
tested is whether δ = 0, i.e. whether language has no effect on earnings once we control
for other relevant characteristics.
An issue that arises here is the potential endogeneity of the variable nonnative,
that is the possibility that E(ε|nonnative) 6= 0. We could have a positive correlation
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between nonnatives and ε if individuals who move are positively self selected. In other
words, the typical individual who decides to move, and thereby becomes a nonnative
in terms of language, could have relatively higher earnings whether or not he chooses
to move.
To further analyse this issue, we assume that the decision to become a nonnative
obeys the following latent model:
nonnative∗ = z′γ + u (2)
nonnative = 1 if nonnative∗ > 0, i.e. u > −z′γ
nonnative = 0 if nonnative∗ ≤ 0, i.e. u ≤ −z′γ
where z collects all variables in x plus any other variables that affect the moving
decision but not earnings, for example those that capture mobility cost. The following
proxies for mobility costs are used: a binary indicator variable for being married, an
indicator variable for being married to a person who has a different mother tongue, an
interaction between this variable and an indicator for gender being female, and number
of children.
We furthermore assume that x and z are exogenous, i.e. E(ε|x, z) = 0 and E(u|z) =
0. If u and ε are correlated direct estimation of the earnings equation with OLS would
produce selectivity bias, since the regressor nonnative is correlated with the error term
(the regressor depends on u, and u and ε are correlated). We will use various approaches
to correct for the possibility that nonnatives might be positively self selected and to
analyse the robustness of the results depending on the model specification.
5.1 Joint Normal Distribution and Maximum Likelihood Es-
timation
Assume that ε and u are bivariate normally distributed with mean zero, variances σ2ε
and 1, and correlation ρ. This is the well-known set-up discussed by Heckman (1974),
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who showed that the model parameters can be consistently estimated by either a two-
step method or maximum likelihood. Under bivariate normality, the expected wage,
conditional on being nonnative, is given by
E(w|x, z, nonnative = 1) = α+ x′β + δ + ρλ(z′γ) (3)
where λ is the inverse Mills ratio φ(z′γ)/Φ(z′γ) and φ and Φ are the density and
cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, respectively. If ρ=0
there is no self-selection problem. However, if ρ >0 then nonnatives are positively
selected, i.e., their wages will exceed those of otherwise similar natives.
To apply Heckman’s two step method, we estimate in a first step a probit model to
obtain a consistent estimator of γ. Then we construct the variable λˆ as follows:
λˆ = φ(z′γˆ)/Φ(z′γˆ) if nonnative = 1
λˆ = −φ(z′γˆ)/(1− Φ(z′γˆ)) if nonnative = 0
In a second step we estimate Equation (3) by OLS using λˆ instead of λ. Standard
errors need to be adjusted.
An alternative method is to jointly estimate the earnings equation and the selection
equation using full maximum likelihood (where the two-step estimator may be used as
starting value). Identification is achieved both through functional form, and by virtue
of excluding the mobility cost related variables (marital status, number of children)
from the outcome equation. The disadvantage of these two methods is that they don’t
work if the errors of both equations are not normally distributed.
5.2 Alternatives to Heckman’s method
There are a couple of possibilities to relax the strong assumptions underlying the
previous model. A first possibility is to estimate the model without imposing that
ε and u are bivariate normally distributed. Assume instead that only u is normally
distributed. Then we can use the following two-step procedure: first, we estimate the
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probit model P (nonnative) = Φ(z′γ) and obtain the fitted probabilities Φ(z′γˆ). In a
second step we estimate the following model by OLS.
w = α+ x′β + δΦ(z′γˆ) + u (4)
Wooldridge (2000) refers to this as the ”plug-in” model. As before, δ measures the
treatment effect. The disadvantage of this method is that consistency of the OLS esti-
mators relies on the probit model being the correct specification, i.e. on the normality
of u.
If one wants to estimate without any distributional assumption, instrumental vari-
able techniques can be applied. This of course requires that a good instrument for
treatment is available. If more than one instrument is available, the validity of the
instruments can be tested. We will use the following instruments: number of kids,
mixed marriage, female×mixed marriage and married, where married is a marital sta-
tus indicator variable and mixed marriage is a dummy variable equal to one for people
married to someone who has a different mother tongue.
5.3 Classical Switching Regression Model
All methods so far are based on the outcome equation (1): this equation has a single
error ε, which means that the gain (or loss) from moving to another region (and thus
from becoming a nonnative) is the same, and equal to δ, for all persons. Therefore, if
selectivity is present (if u and ε are correlated) it must be based on absolute advantage,
as people who move would be better (or worse) everywhere. This may not be a very
realistic characterization of the selection process, and we may instead be interested in a
model where selection is based on relative advantage. To obtain such a model, consider
a more general approach where each group has its own earnings equation as follows:
If nonnative=0
w0 = α0 + x
′β0 + ε0 (5)
If nonnative=1
w1 = α1 + x
′β1 + ε1 (6)
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Let the decision to move be generated from the same model as in equation (2).
This is the classical switching regressions model in which the returns to the variables
included in x as well as the errors ε0 and ε1 of a person as native or as nonnative are
potentially different. Different errors mean that a person could have above average
earnings if she moved, but average (or below average) earnings if she decided to stay.
People who choose to move may be the ones who gain most from moving.
In this case we estimate two models, one for natives and one for nonnatives. We use
a two-step method following Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2000). Assume that ε0, ε1
and u have a trivariate normal distribution. Then, the procedure is as follows: first, we
estimate a probit model of the decision to move and we compute λˆ. In a second step
we estimate Equations (5) and (6) including the correspondent λˆ as another variable.
If we find that the coefficients of λˆ are significant and different between groups then
we have some evidence to think that nonnatives are self selected and that the decision
to move is based on the comparative advantages.
A problem here is that we do not obtain an estimation of the treatment effect
directly from the regression outcome. To obtain the treatment effect we need to do
some extra calculations. At this point we should distinguish between two different
parameters: the average treatment effect (ATE) and the effect of the treatment on the
treated (TT). The ATE in our application is the expected gain or loss from moving for
a randomly chosen individual and it is simply:
ATE ≡ E(w1 − w0)
where the expectations are taken with respect to ε and x. The TT is the average
gain or loss from moving for those who actually moved and it is estimated as follows:
TT ≡ E(w1 − w0|nonnative = 1)
We didn’t need to make this distinction before as ATE equals TT in the case when
ε1 = ε0.
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6 Results
Two basic specifications of the earnings equation are reported in Table 2. The first one
includes the variable nonnative, standard variables used in the human capital earnings
function such as years of schooling and experience, a dummy variable german region, to
see whether there is a general premium for living in the German part regardless of the
language one speaks, a variable for working status and a variable for place of residence.
The second specification, in column (2), adds two variables to control for community
characteristics of the respondent’s place of residence. These are the unemployment
rate and the share of nonnatives who have the same mother tongue as the respondent
in his/her commune of residence. The models are estimated using Ordinary Least
Squares and pooling together both years but correcting the standard errors to account
for pooling observations.
——– Table 2 ——–
The coefficient of nonnative in column (1) is practically zero so there is no earn-
ings premium for natives when we hold the other human capital variables constant.
For years of schooling and experience the results are standard. For example, each ad-
ditional year of schooling increases earnings by approximately 8%. The earnings of
people living in the German part are estimated to be about 6% above those of people
living in the French part. This effect is statistically significant at conventional levels.
The regional wage disparities might be due to differences in industrial structure and
economic activity between regions. The coefficients of the variables full-time and urban
show that full-time workers have a 6% premium and that people who live in an urban
area earn in average 3% more than their counterparts who live in a rural zone. The
community variables added in column (2) are not significant. Therefore, we have no
evidence that earnings of nonnatives are influenced by the proportion of people in the
commune who speak the same language as mother tongue or by the unemployment
rate. For that reason, we will use the first specification of the earnings equation from
now on.
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The sign of nonnative’s point estimate would indicate that the labor markets are
indeed perfectly integrated. However, as we said in Section 5, we might be overesti-
mating the coefficient of nonnative if individuals who move are positively self selected.
For this reason we proceed to use the methods described in the previous section to
correct for selectivity bias.
——– Table 3 ——–
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 we report the results for Heckman’s two step and
maximum likelihood methods respectively. The full set of results is given in Table 5
in Appendix B. The coefficient of nonnative is now positive and insignificant in both
cases. The coefficient of λ, ρ, is negative, which means that people who move are
negatively selected, i.e. the ”worst” people move. If an average person moved from
his/her region of origin his/her earnings would be between 8 and 12 % higher than
earnings of natives. However the coefficients are insignificant, so we do not have any
evidence to conclude that there is a selectivity problem.
Table 3, column (4) and (5), reports the results of the Plug-in and IV methods.
Again, the coefficient of nonnative is positive and insignificant in both cases. As
mentioned in Section 5.2, we use marital status related variables as instruments for the
IV part. These are standard instruments as they are thought to influence the decision
to move without affecting earnings directly. Indeed, a Sargan test for overidentification
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variables are valid instruments.
When we perform a Hausman test to compare the coefficients from the OLS model
with the coefficients from 2SLS we find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
difference between the coefficient (χ2 = 0.06). This means that as before we have no
evidence to suggest that E(ε|nonnative) 6= 0. Therefore, confirming the results from
the Heckman models, we find no evidence of self-selection.
However, these results could be due to the fact that the models are misspecified
or too restrictive. Next, we consider the possibility that people who move have a
comparative advantage rather than an absolute advantage, i.e. we allow the error
terms ε of both groups to differ. To do so we estimate a switching regression model.
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The results from the estimation of the natives and nonnatives equations are reported
in Table 4, column (1) and (2) respectively, where we use the same specification of the
earnings equation that we use for the OLS estimation. The full set of results is given
in Table 6 in Appendix B.
——– Table 4 ——–
After performing an F -test to compare the coefficients from the natives and non-
natives equations we conclude that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coef-
ficients from both equations are the same. There is no evidence that β differs between
the two groups. Therefore we estimate another model where we allow only the errors
to be different, which simplifies the analysis as we obtain again an estimation of the
treatment effect parameter directly from the regression outcome. This is reported in
column (3) of Table 4.
The coefficient of nonnative is once again positive and insignificant. The sign of
ρ1, that is the sign of the correlation between ε1 and u, is negative, which suggests
that people who loose more from moving are the ones who move (i.e., there is selection
based on comparative disadvantage). This wouldn’t make sense if people’s decision to
move were based only on income considerations. Instead, this finding suggests that the
individual decision to move is mostly based on other, not income-related, factors.
Moreover, the results reported in column (3) show that the difference between
λ0 and λ1 is not significant so we cannot reject the null hypothesis that ε1 = ε0.
Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that either Heckman’s or the 2SLS methods are
appropriate. Furthermore, as we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no selectivity we
have no argument against using OLS.
To repeat, the perfect integration hypothesis says that assuming perfect bilingual-
ism among the Swiss population, equally qualified workers should earn the same, re-
gardless of their mother tongue. Depending on the detailed specification, the coefficient
of nonnative is either zero (OLS) or positive but insignificant (after controlling for se-
lectivity bias). The lack of precision is clearly affected by the small sample size, with
only 124 observations on nonnatives. How strong evidence is this with regard to the
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perfect integration hypothesis? Note that we would require the finding of a significant
negative coefficient in order to reject perfect integration. Thus, at a minimum, the
evidence is compatible with integrated labor markets.
7 Conclusions
This paper was concerned with the earnings of natives and nonnatives living in the
German and French linguistic regions of Switzerland. The hypothesis says that equally
qualified workers residing in the same region should have the same earnings no matter
their mother tongue if the labor market was perfectly integrated.
The evidence for the empirical analysis was based on data from the first and second
waves of the Swiss household panel for the years 1999 and 2000. In the study we
used a human capital earnings function to which we add specific variables to control
for the influence of language. The results show no evidence of a negative earnings
differential between nonnatives and natives even after accounting for self-selection of
internal migrants. Therefore we cannot reject the hypothesis that the Swiss labor
market is perfectly integrated. On the other hand, we did not find any evidence to
suggest that people who move are positively self selected. Indeed, individuals who
move don’t seem to have neither an absolute nor a comparative advantage. This fact
seems to suggest that people move influenced by factors other than earnings.
This paper is the first study of its kind using data from the Swiss Household Panel.
Because we consider the topic of this paper of substantial policy concern, the question
of the ways in which the individual’s mother tongue can affect one’s economic wealth
still needs to be examined more deeply. In order to deepen the analysis, we plan to use
in further studies data on regional and communal characteristics from the census 2000
instead of 1990 as well as a data set with more information about Italian speakers and
the Italian canton in order to include them in the analysis.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Native Nonnative Whole Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Log earnings 11.25 11.22 11.25
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Years of schooling 13.67 13.69 13.67
(0.03) (0.20) (0.03)
Experience 21.35 24.62 21.43
(0.15) (0.98) (0.15)
Female 0.46 0.64 0.46
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Observations 5075 124 5199
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2: Regression estimates of earnings by OLS
(1) (2)
Nonnative 0.001 0.01
(0.046) (0.053)
Education 0.078 0.079
(0.004)* (0.004)*
Experience 0.039 0.039
(0.003)* (0.003)*
Experience2/100 -0.06 -0.059
(0.006)* (0.006)*
Female -0.234 -0.231
(0.018)* (0.018)*
Year 2000 0.008 0.007
(0.009) (0.009)
German region 0.055 0.069
(0.015)* (0.020)*
Urban 0.029 0.024
(0.014)** (0.014)+
Full-time 0.058 0.05
(0.023)** (0.023)**
Unemployment rate 0.009
(0.009)
Percentage nonnatives in the commune -0.001
(0.002)
Constant 9.695 9.678
(0.072)* (0.072)*
Observations 5201 5103
R-squared 0.28 0.28
Dependent variable: logarithmic earnings
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
Source: SHP, Waves 1999-2000.
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Table 3: Treatment Effects correcting for selection bias
OLS Heckman 2S Heckman ML Plug-in∗ IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nonnative 0.001 0.118 0.076 0.073 0.042
(0.046) (0.118) (0.098) (0.176) (0.146)
Lambda -0.057 -0.037
(0.055) (0.037)
Hausman Test, χ2 0.06
Test for OI, χ2 8.32
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28
Dependent variable: logarithmic earnings
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗Standard errors are not corrected for generated regressors
Source: SHP, Waves 1999-2000
n=5199
Table 4: Treatment Effects in the extended Heckman selection model
Nonnative Native Whole Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Nonnative 0.179
(0.16)
Lambda1 -0.171 -0.093
(0.083)** (0.074)
Lambda0 0.05 0.041
(0.12) (0.121)
Observations 124 5075 5199
R-squared 0.22 0.28 0.28
See Table 2
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Appendix A: Variables
Name Description
Log earnings The natural logarithm of the annual gross work income (in
the year prior to the interview). We use the real income to
account for changes in price levels. For this purpose we deflate
the nominal incomes from 1998 and 1999 using the correspon-
dent CPI published by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics
(1998=98.0, 1999=98.8). As we include part and full-time
workers we need to adjust the earnings of part-time workers
in order to make them comparable with earnings of full-time
workers. In order to do this we compute full-time equiva-
lent earnings dividing reported earnings by the percentage of
employment.
Nonnative Dummy variable that equals 1 for people who live in a region
where their mother tongue matches the dominant language
and zero otherwise
German region Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent lives in the Ger-
man region
Years of schooling It was constructed assigning numbers between 7 and 18 to the
variable ’highest obtained education’
Experience = age-education-6
Female Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a female and
0 otherwise
Year 2000 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation belongs to the
year 2000 and 0 otherwise
Urban Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent lives in an urban
area and 0 otherwise
Full-time Dummy variable equal to 1 if the person works more than
80% and 0 otherwise
Married Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is married or
has a partner and 0 otherwise
Mixed Marriage Dummy variable equal to one for people married to a person
who has another mother tongue
Number of kids Number of kids
Percentage of non-
natives in the com-
mune
Percentage of nonnatives in the respondent’s commune who
have the same mother tongue as the respondent
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Appendix B: Tables
Table 5: Treatment Effects correcting for selection bias
OLS 2S ML Plug-in IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nonnative 0.001 0.118 0.076 0.073 0.042
(0.046) (0.118) (0.098) (0.176) (0.146)
Years of schooling 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
(0.004)* (0.003)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.003)*
Experience 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039
(0.003)* (0.002)* (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.002)*
Experience2/100 -0.059 -0.06 -0.06 -0.061 -0.06
(0.006)* (0.006)* (0.005)* (0.006)* (0.005)*
Female -0.234 -0.235 -0.235 -0.235 -0.234
(0.018)* (0.015)* (0.018)* (0.018)* (0.015)*
Year 2000 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
German region 0.055 0.06 0.058 0.058 0.056
(0.015)* (0.015)* (0.016)* (0.017)* (0.015)*
Urban 0.029 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.014)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.013)**
Full-time 0.058 0.059 0.058 0.058 0.058
(0.023)** (0.017)* (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.017)*
Constant 9.678 9.69 9.692 9.692 9.693
(0.072)* (0.054)* (0.072)* (0.072)* (0.054)*
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28
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Continuation Table 5 : Estimation of the selection equation
OLS Heckman 2S Heckman ML Plug-in IV
Years of schooling 0.028 0.027 0.028
(0.02) (0.021) (0.02)
Experience 0.032 0.03 0.032
(0.017)+ (0.023) (0.022)
Experience2/100 -0.038 -0.036 -0.038
(0.037) (0.048) (0.048)
Female 0.14 0.144 0.14
(0.108) (0.134) (0.135)
Mixed marriage 0.763 0.787 0.763
(0.186)* (0.242)* (0.236)*
Female mixed marriage 1.044 1.016 1.044
(0.248)* (0.322)* (0.317)*
Married -0.417 -0.425 -0.417
(0.102)* (0.134)* (0.132)*
Number kids -0.058 -0.054 -0.058
(0.052) (0.059) (0.058)
Year 2000 0.035 0.032 0.035
(0.086) (0.059) (0.059)
German region -0.678 -0.677 -0.678
(0.086)* (0.110)* (0.110)*
Urban -0.11 -0.105 -0.11
(0.093) (0.093) (0.092)
Fulltime -0.104 -0.102 -0.104
(0.115) (0.14) (0.139)
Constant -2.196 -2.175 -2.196
(0.385)* (0.416)* (0.416)*
Lambda -0.057 -0.037
(0.055) (0.037)
Observations 5199 5199 5199 5199 5199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors in column (2) are adjusted for generated regressors
Source: SHP, Waves 1999-2000
n=5199
Column (2) reports the Treatment effect estimate obtained using Heckman two step method
Column(3) reports the Treatment effect estimate obtained using Heckman full maximum likelihood
Model in column (4) is estimated plugging the fitted probabilities from a probit estimation of nonna-
tives in the outcome regression
Model in column (5) is estimated by 2SLS
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Table 6: Treatment Effects in the extended Heckman selection model
Nonnatives Natives Whole sample
(1) (2) (3)
Nonnative 0.179
(0.16)
Years of schooling 0.061 0.079 0.078
(0.030)** (0.004)* (0.004)*
Experience 0.01 0.04 0.039
(0.024) (0.003)* (0.003)*
Experience2 -0.014 -0.062 -0.061
(0.047) (0.006)* (0.006)*
Female -0.365 -0.231 -0.233
(0.101)* (0.018)* (0.018)*
Year 2000 -0.016 0.009 0.008
(0.08) (0.009) (0.009)
German region 0.106 0.051 0.052
(0.114) (0.018)* (0.018)*
Urban 0.189 0.025 0.029
(0.094)** (0.014)+ (0.014)**
Full-time 0.018 0.061 0.059
(0.106) (0.023)* (0.023)*
Lambda1 -0.171 -0.093
(0.083)** (0.074)
Lambda0 0.05 0.041
(0.12) (0.121)
Constant 10.639 9.688 9.694
(0.602)* (0.072)* (0.072)*
Observations 124 5075 5199
R-squared 0.22 0.28 0.28
See Table 2
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